At attempt at countering

Posted: October 22nd, 2009 | Author: dixwell | Filed under: Uncategorized |

Given the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, a complexity that Lyons seemingly ignored, I am going to try to respond point by point and keep this as concise as possible.

 

“From the U.S. perspective, Afghanistan is the absolute end of the earth. Indeed, it’s not a nation at all. The idea that well-intentioned Westerners can create an efficient central government on, say, the Swiss model, where none has ever existed, much less one acceptable to Afghanistan’s many warring tribes, sects and ethnic factions, is almost certainly a delusion.”

 

Choose a point of history before the Soviet invasion and Afghanistan has had a series of functioning governments within and extending beyond its current borders. The concept that ‘warring tribes, sects and ethnic factions’ make it impossible to rule is more ignorant and delusional than the supposed ‘white mans burden’ the author alludes to  with this ‘well intentioned Westerners’. One could look to any number of examples throughout time and across the globe of perfectly capable governments rising out of diversity and factionalism. The argument being made for a military increase in Afghanistan (which was a state, ableit a taliban state, before we invaded) is that Afghanistan deserves the opportunity to create a state for itself, and that the people of Afghanistan can do so. Our presence stems out of necessity, we created a monstrosity of a situation by creating a power vacuum and then only did a half-assed job in our attempts to create a safe atmosphere for a government to be built.

 

“Almost nobody believes a recount would solve anything. “Even if every Afghan casts their vote for (runner-up) (Abdullah) Abdullah, he won’t be president because the foreigners don’t want him to be,” another man told her. “Nobody respected the people’s vote.””

 

Almost every foreign nation and organization involved has wanted the recount to exist, for the exact reason that it the nation of Afghanistan needs to make its own fair and just decision about its rulers. The above quote points to skepticism about the intention of the Western forces, not to the Afghanis commitment to or desire for a national government.

In the author’s following paragraph he provides no basis or evidence for reasoning in that an effort at a unity government would prove illusory. His mention of the Afghans distrust of the Karzai government says nothing about the ability to form a government or the effect that a military push could have.

 

Lyons goes on to describe the account of David Rohde, and use his first hand experience as a glimpse at the motivations of the insurgency. However, he lacks a point. In fact by expanding upon the rationality of the insurgents, and highlighting the fact that only “Ten percent are hardcore ideologues fighting for the Taliban.” Lyons lays out the very reasons for the possibility of success. The remaining ninety percent are not people we have to be fighting. With the ability to provide safe development, an accountable and legitimate government, and a change in strategy, NATO forces should be able to focus on those who truly pose a threat to America and to Afghanistan.

 

“Who in the world would be angry with him except the Washington war lobby and Osama bin Laden?”

The author fails to even discuss what would happen upon an American withdrawal. Presumabely he might believe that facing the issue of sovereignty the ‘nice’ ninety percent would create their own state entities of some sort, no longer have a reason to band with the terrorists, and perhaps turn on them? Creating a quiet state that doesn’t care about its neighbors? Perhaps, this failed to be the case in the past.

Even people who harbor passionate hatred for Americans can act rationally. What possible incentive would the extreme militants have for not ‘liberating’ Afghanistan? The Taliban government ruled in the past, and provided a safe haven for the terrorist attack that ignited this whole conflict.  

An even larger reason for the threat posed to America by the conflict in Afghanistan (not the Afghani people) is the collapse of an Afghani state and its effect upon Pakistan. To ignore this issue ignores the very heart of the debate.

 

 

 

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